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This paper examines the role of urban subalterns both as participatory agents in
the Arab revolutions and as mediating forces against revolutionary action. The
main argument it advances is that the positioning of urban subalterns during
revolutionary periods should be understood in relation to their socio-spatial
location in the complex urban political configuration. This configuration is
shaped by power contests involving government, political elites, and diverse
societal forces. Taking the revolutionary protest movements in Cairo and
Damascus as my cases for comparison, I will examine the differentiated
location of subaltern actors in each of these urban settings to draw out how
their positioning in relation to state and government has shaped their engage-
ment in the respective revolutions.
In the Egyptian case, the leading forces of the spectacular Tahrir Square
protests, according to popularized accounts, were the educated, middle-class
youth—the media-savvy Internet users.1 This narrative underestimates
popular forces in terms of both the role they played in the Revolution and
their modes of engagement with it. In contrast, this paper will explore the
modes of urban popular action before and during the Tahrir days of the Revolu-
tion; it will look at confrontations between popular forces and agents of the
state (especially the police), the mobilization of residents of urban popular
quarters, and agitation and revolutionary action within popular quarters. My
argument is that popular patterns of activism in Cairo are anchored in forms
Acknowledgments: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference Urban Revolu-
tions in the Age of Global Urbanism, held in Jakarta, Indonesia, 16–20 March 2012. I thank the
conference organizers and participants for their thoughtful comments. I also thank the anonymous
CSSH reviewers for their critical feedback and suggestions. The research for this paper was sup-
ported by an Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC) research fellowship
(Res-000-27-0007) and by an ESRC grant (Res-062-23-2283).
1 For an example of media representations of the Revolution as an event that originated in and
was managed by Facebook, see Crovitz 2011. For an analysis of the Revolution as a “decidedly
middle-class uprising,” see Kandil 2012.
Comparative Studies in Society and History 2013;55(4):865–894.
0010-4175/13 $15.00 # Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 2013
doi:10.1017/S0010417513000443
865
of everyday interaction between popular forces and agents of government,
which, in turn, have shaped the urban subjectivities that entered into the
making of “the people” as the subject of the Revolution. Drawing on my field-
work in Cairo’s informal markets in 2010, and my earlier work with residents of
informal urban quarters, I will situate the formation of oppositional subjectiv-
ities in the context of macro socio-political developments brought about by
neoliberal economic policies, namely the growth of informality in housing
and employment and the intensification of state security politics.2
In this account of the role of urban popular forces in the Revolution, I zero
in on a particular constellation of micro-power relations and dynamics of inter-
action that were formative of oppositional subjectivities enacted during the
revolutionary protests in Tahrir and in their aftermath. Undoubtedly, the
increased level of political mobilization in the preceding decade and the accu-
mulated experience of organized activism by various social and political actors
such as workers, professionals, and youth groups are also key factors in
accounting for the revolutionary activism of Tahrir.3 Thus, while my attention
to the micro- and local-levels of action is intended to elucidate how popular
repertoires of action and resistance are spatially grounded and territorialized,
it is important to take note that the local concerns of popular forces, such as
police violence, and struggles for housing rights and social services, were
not isolated from the national demands espoused in Tahrir—local activism
articulated with the nation-wide mobilization that began on 25 January 2011.
The Syrian case provides a counterpoint to the Egyptian one, and allows
for a comparative analysis of the role of urban subaltern forces in the Arab
revolutions. This comparison puts that role into sharper focus, revealing not
only differing forms of organization and activism among subalterns, but also
varying levels of cohesion and lines of division. Damascus presents a striking
example of the fragmented nature of subalternity. Owing to the configuration of
the urban space and its modes of control by the Syrian ruling regime, it was
difficult for subaltern forces in Damascus to undertake the same type of mobil-
ization and occupation of central public spaces as witnessed in Cairo. The frag-
mentation of subalternity in socio-spatial terms has been instrumentalized by
the regime to divide subalterns and undermine the formation of a unified
popular opposition.
2 I undertook extended periods of fieldwork in a number of popular neighborhoods of Cairo
between 1999 and the end of 2010. In the early part of this period, I worked predominately in
Bulaq al-Dakrur (see Ismail 2006). In a later stage, I spent most of 2010 working in al-Moski
market and al-Gammaliyya neighborhood.
3 For an overview of social and political mobilization in preceding years, see El-Ghobashy 2011.
See also Beinin (2012) on labor mobilization and its contribution to the “culture of protest” wit-
nessed in the Revolution. On the youth protest groups that played an important mobilizational
role, see Ezbawy 2012.
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The paper will focus on three features of the Damascene urban setting that
help to explain patterns of mobilization and protest there: first, the fragmenta-
tion of subaltern identities where sectarian identification is an element of urban
divisions; second, the inscription of apparatuses of violence in urban space in a
manner that deepens divisions and manipulates sectarian identification; and
third, a particular pattern of urban reconfiguration by virtue of which segments
of subaltern migrant populations are positioned as buffers between the regime
and other subaltern groups. These features of urban space in Damascus reveal
how the history and character of urban reconfigurations can be crucial to the
shape and course of popular protests and mobilizations during revolutionary
periods. In Damascus, informality in housing and employment are factors of
social differentiation and division among subalterns as much as between sub-
alterns and dominant forces. My discussion here will draw on fieldwork in
various urban quarters of the city prior to the revolutionary Uprising that com-
menced in March of 2011 and on interviews with youth activists during the
Uprising.4 I will briefly sketch the reconfiguration of Damascus under the
rule of the al-Asad regime, which will allow for a more nuanced examination
of the differentiated subaltern subjectivities within the popular Uprising.
T H E S U B A LT E R N , T H E P O P U L A R , A N D T H E Q U E S T I O N O F
P O L I T I C A L A G E N C Y
Before proceeding with my comparative analysis of Cairo and Damascus prior
to and during the revolutions, a note regarding my use of the category of “urban
subalterns” is in order. As will become apparent, I use the terms “subaltern
forces” and “popular forces” interchangeably. In doing so, I aim to effect an
analytical approximation, if not a translation. “Popular forces” is the category
used in studies of the Arab Middle East to refer to diverse social actors who are
distinguished primarily from the dominant social, political, and cultural elites.5
These actors, though neither homogenous nor forming a singular entity, are
seen to draw on common social and cultural frames of reference and to share
a degree of socio-spatial proximity, occupying city quarters conventionally
referred to as “popular quarters” (al-ahyya’ al-sha‘biyya). Further, Al-Sha‘b
(the people) and al-Quwwa al-Sha‘biyya (popular forces) are the terms used
in Arabic to denote non-elite but socially diverse actors. Both terms have
acquired a dense and rich symbolism through a long history of use, from
4 I conducted fieldwork between November 2004 and June 2005 in a number of neighborhoods
in Damascus, primarily in the informal quarters of Qaboun, Barzeh, Mezza 86, Sbina, Qadam, and
Dahadil. I also interviewed merchants in the markets of Hamidiyya and Hariqa, as well as residents
of a number of old quarters. During a second period of extended fieldwork (between the end of
November 2010 and the end of May 2011), I interviewed political dissidents and youth activists
involved in organizing demonstrations and in the cultural work of the Uprising.
5 The categories of “popular forces” and “popular politics” are also widely deployed in analyses
of Latin American and African politics.
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referring to agents of anti-colonial and emancipation struggles, to the somewhat
romanticized bearers of cultural authenticity and social valor, or, with some-
times stigmatizing intent, to “the people” as an uncultured mass that is either
apathetic or prone to violent outbursts. Inspired by “writing history from
below” and Gramscian conceptions of counter-hegemony, among other theor-
etical approaches, a body of scholarly work has explored the “people’s” politi-
cal agency by giving attention to popular spaces, social fields of action, and
informal politics (see, for example, Singerman 1995; Gelvin 1998).
Like the term “popular forces,” “subaltern” has been deployed to describe
social actors who are defined by their exclusion from the formal political sphere
and by their marginalization, and who are considered, from both culturalist and
economistic perspectives, to lack political agency. The construct of “subaltern”
was developed to challenge the denial of the political agency of subordinate
groups. There have been many scholarly debates on different uses and merits
of the term, but I will not address these here (see O’Hanlon and Washbrook
1992; Prakash 1992; and Lal 2001). Instead, I want to elucidate the conceptual
common ground between “popular forces” and “urban subalterns” for analyti-
cal purposes. “Subaltern,” drawn from Gramsci’s writings, was formulated by
modern Indian historians seeking to recover the struggles and political contri-
butions, omitted in colonial and elite historiography, of populations distin-
guished from the elite and enmeshed in relations of domination.6 In this new
project of writing Indian history, the non-elites were thought of as “the
people” and subalternity denoted their state/condition of subordination (Guha
1988; Spivak 2005; Roy 2011).7 I want to draw on this early conceptualization
of the subaltern and to engage with more recent reflections on subaltern urban-
ism to enrich the analysis of urban popular forces in the Middle East, and par-
ticularly of their role in the recent revolutions.8 The same analytical questions
that have been posed about “popular forces” have also been raised in relation to
urban “subalterns,”most importantly regarding their socio-spatial positionality,
their grounds of action, and the factors that shape their political subjectivities
(see Roy 2011). It is here that we can reap the benefits of analytical translation.
Ananya Roy’s (2011) critical propositions on subaltern urbanism revisit
conventional equations between subalternity and dispossession, and between
6 For a broad consideration of the issues involved in the writing of Indian history, see Chakra-
barty 1992.
7 Guha, a founding and leading figure of the Subaltern Studies collective, uses “the people” and
“the subaltern” interchangeably (1988). The relation between the subaltern and the popular is sub-
jected to a critical reexamination in a thematic 2005 issue of Postcolonial Studies, in which a
number of the contributors argue against what Spivak called the slippage from subaltern to the
popular (e.g., see note 9 below).
8 For an example of writings on the Middle East influenced by Subaltern Studies, see Beinin
(2001) and Webber (1998). Chalcraft (2008) explores the promise of an analytical engagement
with Subaltern Studies by scholars of the Middle East. See Mallon (1994) for a discussion of the
influence of Subaltern Studies on Latin Americanists.
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informality and poverty. Roy’s critique problematizes static and essentialist
constructs of subalterns as fixed sociological categories pinned down in topo-
graphical and ontological terms. Challenging conceptions of informal urban
spaces as “the habitus of the dispossessed,” that assign a particular topography
to subalterns, she points to the differentiated nature of informality that is
effected through governmental administrative and regulatory practices. In
agreement with Spivak (2005), Roy critiques the inscription of the subaltern
in the popular, a move which, according to Spivak, assigns the subaltern an
identity, and thereby ontologizes subalternity.9 But I argue that this ontologiz-
ing of the subaltern is not inevitable if we view the identity of the popular as
being itself relational and contextually produced, even when popular identity
finds anchor in historical cultural traditions and asserts continuity and stability.
Furthermore, “the subaltern” and “the popular” are mutually inscribed cat-
egories in the sense that if subalternity is about the subordinate subject’s
assumption of agency, “the popular,” as identity, similarly does not escape
power practices and related normative and material hierarchies that cast it as
subordinate. In this sense, “the popular” preserves identity as an element
central to practices of domination and contestation. In fact, this identity
enters into the making of the oppositional subject; that is, it is an element of
political agency.
How do these theoretical propositions inform my analysis of the two
cases, and how do the cases add to our understanding of the popular and the
subaltern? In approaching urban popular forces as subalterns, I hope to
capture the relational character of their subordination. In Cairo, it is in inter-
actions with government and the police, within the context of a conjunction
of neoliberal and security politics, that popular forces’ subordination is effected
and their assumption of oppositional subjectivities takes place. In this respect, I
do not propose to see popular quarters as the habitation of the dispossessed, or
informality as an ontological state. Roy’s remarks on informality as being the
9 Spivak (2005) defines the subaltern as “a position without identity,” a premise upon which she
bases her rejection of the slippage from “subaltern” to “popular” and her critique of the analytical
use of “the people” as an instance of “an abstract posing as the concrete.” There is a programmatic
element to Spivak’s formulations: proceeding from an insistence on the singularity of subaltern
action and the unrecognizable character of subaltern agency, she proposes an understanding of col-
lective agency as that of having the part that agrees stand for the whole, a move that she conceives
of as conditional on the putting aside of difference (i.e., suspending identity). Spivak seems to be
positing identity (and at some point in her analysis culture as well) as an essentializing claim to
difference that, by definition, possesses a reactionary potential; she protests that “identity slides
into culture,” which in turn is “often indistinguishable from religion.” It is unclear why identity
claims and identity-making practices should negate subalternity as a condition and relation, and
why these should be, by definition, reactionary. This raises the question of the basis on which
the definition of subalternity, as proposed by Spivak, should be limited to a certain kind of poli-
tics—“emancipatory”—to the exclusion of others—“identitarian” or “nationalist.” Spivak’s prop-
ositions on “identity,” “culture,” and “religion” are made in a sweeping fashion more in the
order of polemics than of analytic diagnostics.
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effect of power relations ring true when we look at the differentiated position-
ing of informal quarters of Damascus vis-à-vis the Uprising, where occupying
informal space does not necessarily translate into opposition to the regime. In
reality, it is within the informal production of space that divisions among sub-
altern populations are produced. Finally, in inscribing the subaltern in the
popular, I am interested in thinking out the grounds of political agency in
relation to the subjectivities that arise from popular forces’ interactions with
government. Rather than proceeding from a priori assumptions about subal-
terns’ political agency, I will tease out the complex factors that shape subal-
terns’ positioning within the web of power and control.
P O P U L A R F O R C E S A N D S PAT I A L I Z E D R E S I S TA N C E
I N T H E E G Y P T I A N R E V O L U T I O N
Popular mobilization and activism has sustained and continues to consolidate
the unfolding Revolution in Egypt. The role played by the popular forces
can only be fully understood in relation to their position in the urban configur-
ation, forms of community organization, modes of activism, social and sym-
bolic capital, and above all their patterns of interaction with government. All
of these factors have shaped their engagement in the protests and their
actions against the regime and its main institution of government, namely the
police. At the same time, popular forces’ repertoires of activism and territoria-
lized resistance articulate with broader political projects. What is more, local
mobilization and actions are informed by Tahrir-centered activism. To trace
the contours of subaltern participation and the forms it has taken, I begin
with a brief sketch of the place of popular quarters in the urban setting. I
will tease out key features, most importantly informality in economic activities
and housing, which afforded these forces a degree of autonomy in their social
organization while in turn informing their antagonistic relations with govern-
ment. In the second subsection, I examine the character and nature of
popular participation to highlight how certain dynamics of the urban form
and the antagonisms inscribed in it have been manifested in the Revolution.
Popular Cairo: Informality and Roots of Dissidence
Here I will summarize aspects of how Cairo has been reconfigured since the
1970s, particularly through the emergence of new popular quarters as spaces
of relative autonomy, dissidence, and contestation against government. Much
of this urban expansion took place informally and independent of state plan-
ning. Ordinary people established residential quarters by either squatting on
state land or building on agricultural land, in both cases violating official regu-
lations governing construction. Many old popular quarters were sites of infor-
mal expansion. This dimension of urban reconfiguration should be viewed
against the background of the state’s retreat from its role of welfare provider
and the implementation of neoliberal economic policies that were first
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instituted in the 1980s and took fully developed form in the 1990s.10 The
growth in informal employment and the increased privatization of social ser-
vices were factors of popular forces’ disengagement from the state and their
attainment of a degree of autonomy. This autonomy was manifested in the
establishment of community-based institutions and mechanisms of dispute
management, the local enforcement of social norms of interaction, and social
support networks (Ismail 2006). In an attempt to contain this growing social
and economic autonomy, the state intensified security politics by expanding
police monitoring and surveillance practices in popular areas.
The history of new-quarters establishment, alongside other factors such as
the prevalence of informal economic activities in them, gave rise to a conflic-
tual relationship with the government when state agents and agencies tried to
impose control in the quarters in the name of law and order. Interaction with
these agents and agencies, particularly with the police, has been a structuring
element of the everyday life of the residents of both the informal quarters
and the city’s old established districts. Police carried out regular and diverse
campaigns in popular neighborhoods with the goal of imposing control
of space and managing the population’s conduct and activities. Accounts of
encounters with the police reveal the development of a particular structure of
feelings, to which humiliation is central (see Ismail 2006; 2012). Often, such
episodes involve police campaigns in markets and seizures of goods and
vending scales. These regular occurrences bear similarities to the market inci-
dent that led Mohammad Bouazizi in Tunisia to commit his extraordinary act of
self-immolation: officers slapping, beating, and shoving vendors and forcefully
seizing scales that are indispensable to earning a living in the market. Such
experiences contribute to the making of an oppositional subject who may act
alone or in concert with others at a given moment.
Urban Subalterns in the Battle for Cairo
In the romanticized images of the Revolution, Tahrir protests are a model of
civil resistance—peaceful, “cultured,” and egalitarian. In such depictions, the
main actors are the middle classes, led and inspired by the educated youth.
Excluded from this narrative are the popular forces, especially the inhabitants
of the city’s informal neighborhoods.11 Also edited out are many of the scenes
10 Welfare provision covered free education, public health insurance, and subsidized foodstuffs.
In the 1950s and 1960s, it also included publicly funded low-income housing projects known as
“popular housing” (masakin sha‘biyya). With economic liberalization, public housing came to con-
stitute a negligible portion of the market, while both public education and health services underwent
a process of masked privatization. Most subsidies on basic foodstuffs were removed.
11 For example, a leftist Egyptian analyst commented in reference to the participation in the pro-
tests of the urban poor, who he identified as “the shanty town dwellers,” that “fortunately thismena-
cing human mass was entirely absent from the revolt, which probably contributed to its civilized
and peaceful character” (see Kandil 2011, my emphasis).
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of violence in the back streets of Tahrir and the popular quarters, including the
burning down of police stations—reportedly ninety-nine of them across the
country.12 The assaults on police stations took place primarily in densely popu-
lated areas long stigmatized in official public discourse for being part of the
city’s “‘ashwa’iyyat” (literally “haphazard communities”) such as Bulaq
al-Dakrur, Matariyya, and Imbaba, and in old popular quarters such as Bab
al-Shi’riyya and Gammaliyya. In these areas protesters stormed and torched
police buildings and set armored cars afire. I contend that, for these protestors,
the Revolution was a revolution against the police (see Ismail 2012). The police
stations were the sites of violent government through torture, verbal abuse, and
humiliation, while police officers have long served as agents of everyday gov-
ernment in the popular quarters.
These attacks aimed to both settle accounts with the police and disarm
them so that the protests could continue. For example, it is reported that in
the old neighborhood of Sayyida Zaynab ten thousand residents marched
to the district police station when the central security forces tried to block a pro-
cession to Tahrir and began firing on demonstrators. The station was burned
after police shot and killed several protestors. This was followed by attacks
on other stations in al-Azbakiyya, Ayn Shams, al-Sahil, and Bassatin, among
others, in what some press reports described as a surge of popular demon-
strations for the control and neutralization of the stations (see al-Youm
al-Sabi‘, 30 Jan. 2012). The centrality to the Revolution of the quarter-based
confrontations with the police was asserted by Gamal Bashir, a youth activist
and former member of the White Knights Ultras, the fan club of the Zamalik
Football team. In a critical commentary on those narratives that represented
the Revolution as a peaceful affair of middle-class youth protests in Tahrir,
he stated: “Let’s not forget what happened in the days between 25 January
and 28 January, this glossed-over part of history.… There were constant
clashes in Omraneya for example, and there were people in Talbiya trying to
get to the Foreign Ministry. The fighting continued long after the political
elite were tear-gassed out of the square on 25 January.” He adds, “[t]he
power of this revolution came from these harafish [a term used to denote the
“rabble” and valorized in the writing of Egyptian novelist Naguib Mahfouz]
burning police stations and from the collapse of the Interior Ministry. That
was utilized by the political elites who centralized the struggle in Tahrir
12 For accounts of assaults on police stations, see al-Masry al-Youm, 30 Jan. 2011; al-Youm
al-Sabi‘, 30 Jan. 2011; and al-Ahram, 10 Feb. 2011. Based on a survey of press reports and pub-
lications of the General Organization for Information (al-Hay’at al-‘Ama li-Isti‘lamat), it is possible
to ascertain that twenty-five police stations were burned in popular quarters of Greater Cairo
between 25 and 28 January 2011 alone. The quarters were: Sayyida Zaynab, Azbakiyya, Ayn
Shams, al-Sahil, al-Bassatin, Dar al-Salam, Helwan, Giza, al-Warraq, al-Talbiyya, al-Umraniyya,
Imbaba, Bulaq al-Dakrur, al-Gammaliyya, Bab al-Shi’riyya, Al-Amiriyya, al-Wayli, al-Marj,
al-Sharrabiya, al-Zawwiyya, al-Zaytun, al-Salam Awal, al-Matariyya, al-Nahda, and Kirdasa.
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Square. Without this confrontation, the revolution wouldn’t have been possible
and every police station was burned to the ground because people have been
dying inside them for years” (cited in Hussein 2012).
Since Mubarak’s resignation, the attacks on police stations have been
subject to much debate. While the Ministry of the Interior and some segments
of the mainstream media have portrayed them as the work of thugs (balta-
giyya), vandals, and criminals, prominent activists have stressed that the police-
station burnings were an organic act of the Revolution.13 The official narratives
deny moral recognition of the contribution of popular-class youth to the Revo-
lution. In a telling development, courts considering cases brought against police
officers accused of shooting protestors in popular neighborhoods have issued
verdicts clearing the officers of wrongdoing. According to summaries of
these deliberations, the courts took the view that the assaults were carried
out by vandals and infiltrators and do not fall within the frame of the events
of the Revolution (see Izzat 2012). Popular-youth actors who died at the
hands of the police in popular neighborhoods were thus denied the status of
revolutionaries and martyrs, leaving their families with little opportunity to
claim compensation let alone moral recognition for the deaths of their sons
and daughters. These court decisions and public debates epitomize contests
over the role of popular forces in the Revolution and the character of their
participation.
My account of popular quarters’ engagement in the Revolution is intended
to convey the importance of the spaces of resistance and stress that the clashes
with the security forces were spatially grounded and expressed the antagonisms
inscribed in the spaces of popular quarters.14 My argument here is that popular
forces’ participation in the Revolution, as observed in these quarter-based con-
frontations, illuminates the territorialized and localized dimensions of resist-
ance. Further, while these battles were integral to the Revolution, they were
also resumptions of unresolved conflicts with agents and agencies of govern-
ment. In this way, local concerns and experiences articulated with the national
project of transformation espoused during the mass mobilization in Tahrir.
13 For example, Nawara Nijm, a spokesperson of the revolutionary youth in Tahrir, stated that
the burning of the stations was an act of revolution, not thuggery (Al-Wafd, 20 Mar. 2012). For a
discussion of the contests surrounding the use of baltagiyya under the Mubarak regime, see
Ismail 2006. For an engaged rebuttal of the stigmatization by mainstream media of the actions
of popular-class youth against the police during the Tahrir days, see Izzat 2012. Izzat asserts that
the Revolution would not have succeeded without “breaking the security arm of the Mubarak
regime,” reminding, “[t]he police was the number one enemy of the Egyptian people under the
rule of Mubarak.” In a similar vein, Mohamed Abo El-Gheit challenges the dominant narratives
of the protests as being led by the April Six movement or the Muslim Brotherhood, asserting
that popular-class youth protected the marches and were instrumental in chasing away the security
forces (2011). I thank an anonymous CSSH reviewer for drawing my attention to Abo El-Gheit’s
blog.
14 I draw on Ismail 2012 for the account of the quarter battles with the police.
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Quarter-based participation in the Revolution took the shape of street
battles in which stones and Molotov cocktails were occasionally used against
the security forces’ live bullets. The clashes with the police and attacks on
their stations pushed them back and undermined their ability to stop protest pro-
cessions from going on to Tahrir Square. This is well illustrated by the battles
that took place in Old City quarters, as in the area known as Fatimid Cairo, and
in the Bulaq Abul al-Ila quarter, which, by virtue of its proximity to Tahrir
Square, became the back streets of the confrontation with the police. In what
follows, I look at these and other quarters that participated in the fights with
the police, and outline the conflictual relations between them and the govern-
ment and the nature of the spatially grounded hostility. My attention to local
action is consonant with Arturo Escobar’s (2001) argument that place-based
struggles can be understood as “subaltern strategies of localization.” It is
such strategies that laid the groundwork for the popular forces’ engagement
in the Revolution.
The battle of Fatimid Cairo, which took place in the old quarter of Gam-
maliyya and the popular market of al-Moski, is a clear example of popular
forces’ locally inscribed participation in the Revolution. The battle was
fought between the people and the police in the first few days of the Revolution
on the main thoroughfares and in al-Moski alleyways. To understand it we must
grasp the topography of the area that was marked by the residents and mer-
chants’ daily encounters and antagonistic relations with the police. This antag-
onism arose in conjunction with police campaigns on the market, which
included routine confiscations of goods. Because the area attracts many tour-
ists, it is subjected to added security surveillance, and workers from the
area’s shops and workshops were often targeted by police practices of ishtibah
wa tahari (stop and investigation) (Ismail 2012). In this setting, the quarter-
based street battles connected with ongoing struggles against government prac-
tices that undermined the area’s livelihood. As in other quarters, local concerns
and experiences of government, with their local inflections, motivated the
area’s activism and participation in the revolutionary protests.
Popular forces within the quarters are neither uniform nor homogeneous in
character and are differentiated by their positions within the local social struc-
ture. This differentiation arises out of modes of insertion into the national and
global economies and highlights the dynamics of socio-economic transform-
ation of the popular strata. For example, with the liberalization of trade, new
layers of merchants and traders emerged with opportunities created by the
import of consumer items from China. In this process, kiosk vendors and ped-
dlers became able to compete with established merchants and undercut the
trade of some. This brought about an increase in competition and had a detri-
mental effect on local workshop production. In assessing these transformations
of the popular market, one merchant of a middle-sized enterprise whom I inter-
viewed asserted that “heads were leveled” (al rus itsawit), meaning that the
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small street vendors, seizing the niches created by the opportunity to import
cheap goods from China, are challenging the area’s middle-sized and possibly
large-scale merchants. This “equalization” has occasioned frictions among
shop-owners and street vendors, which at times has led to fights and police
interventions.
Notwithstanding the hierarchies of the informal market, merchants and
vendors in popular markets such as that of al-Moski found themselves at a com-
petitive disadvantage in relation to large businessmen connected with the
regime and ruling elites. The latter were viewed as influencing trade and
customs regulations to squeeze traders out of informal markets. This appeared
to be the case with the 2010 introduction of a requirement of “quality certifi-
cates” for Chinese goods and a ban on mobile phone imports from China.
These regulations negatively affected both established merchants and newer,
small-scale vendors since all are bound together by informal credit and
finance arrangements and networks of supply and circulation, which are
often organized on the basis of kin relations and regional origin. Though mer-
chants and vendors may be differentiated in economic terms on the basis of the
size of their enterprises and accumulated capital, they may nonetheless find
common ground for opposition to the regime and state agents based on
market arrangements, socio-spatial proximity, and shared grievances against
policies that favor business-elites. As such, it can be argued that a structure
of collective subjectivity grounded the collective action of differentiated
urban subalterns.
As in Gammaliyya, Bulaq Abul al-Ila—an old popular quarter close to
Tahrir Square—facilitated the movement of protestors and provided them
safe passage on the way to Tahrir. On 27 January, Abu al-Ila residents faced
off against central security forces to prevent their entry into the area (I draw
here on Ismail 2012). The defense of place manifested in the street battles is
linked with ongoing struggles to preserve the quarter and local life against
joint state-global capital designs on the neighborhood’s valued real estate. In
the first days of the Revolution, protesters there raised local concerns and
demanded social and economic rights. Subsequently, their demands meshed
with the political project of Tahrir aimed at the removal of the regime.15
Bulaq Abu al-Ila’s conflictual relations with the government and the police
revolved around struggles for housing rights and the maintenance of commu-
nity autonomy through forms of internal governance.
Located in central Cairo, the quarter has been the object of successive
public and private designs of “urban renewal” (on earlier phases of these, see
Ghannam 2002). In the latest phase, multinational real estate companies and
large urban developers have maneuvered to gain possession of empty lots as
15 It should be noted that one of the key slogans of Tahrir is the socially and politically inclusive
“‘aysh, hurriyya, ‘adala igtima‘iyya” (bread, freedom, social justice).
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well as dilapidated old buildings. The real estate investors’ plans were to turn
various sections of Bulaq Abu al-Ila into expensive residential and commercial
centers. Meanwhile, under the Cairo 2050 Plan—conceived as a proposal to
transform Cairo into a “global capital”—the Cairo governorate announced its
intention to repossess residential buildings and shops. In line with this plan,
in the few years preceding the Revolution the police forcibly evicted some
quarter residents after their homes collapsed. Administrative and coercive prac-
tices were, in effect, used to turn areas of Abu al-Ila into slums to pave the way
for eviction and demolition. In joining the revolutionary protests, Bulaq Abu
al-Ila residents’ goals included the defense of the right to housing and
healthy living conditions (see Luccini and Morandini 2011). The conflict
between global capitalism and the inhabitants has intensified over the last
year, indicating that the concerns of popular quarters remain central to the
unfolding Revolution.16
There were other conflicts with government as well, relating to public
order interventions by the police. Abu al-Ila, like other popular quarters of
the city, had established forms of internal governance such as majalis
‘urfiyya (customary councils) to regulate disputes and to eschew police inter-
vention. On occasions when these institutions faltered and conflicting parties
resorted to violence, police found a pretext to enter an area and attempt to estab-
lish control and a more visible and immediate presence. The police also
pursued practices of cooptation and indirect control through pro-regime local
notables, members of the People’s Assembly, and heads of municipalities.
Often these entities overlapped. For example, one of the quarter’s members
of Parliament was a former general in the State Security Department who
enjoyed the support of former Minister of the Interior Habib al-Adli (see
al-Masry al-Youm, 19 Oct. 2010). Other figures of authority and mediation
were proprietors of large-scale enterprises who were members of the now-
dissolved National Democratic Party (interview with steel trader in Bulaq
Abu al-Ila, Apr. 2010). These political and economic contests played out in
the national elections in the quarter and in the struggles over control of the
area’s real estate and diverse trades. These were emblematic of the aforemen-
tioned conjunction of police government and economic interests promoted
by neoliberal policies.
The articulation of locally inscribed antagonism with the national protests
and Tahrir-centered activism evident in Fatimid Cairo and in Bulaq Abu al-Ila
could also be observed in new popular quarters. In quarters such as Bulaq
al-Dakrur, Umraniyya, and Imbaba, some residents stormed and burned the
16 In one part of the district of Bulaq Abu al-Ila, namely Ramlat Bulaq, the residents’ resistance
against eviction attempts by the state, in conjunction with private investors, most notably global
telecommunications tycoon Naguib Sawiris, has taken a violent turn in recent months (see Elshahed
2012).
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police stations, and on 25 January 2011 residents of these quarters organized
marches to Tahrir, thereby lending vital support to national mobilization on
that day. The youth activists who called for the Police Day protest on Facebook
worked with the residents of Bulaq al-Dakrur to plan a procession on 25
January from Nahya Street, one of the quarter’s thoroughfares (interview
with Khaled Abd al-Hamid, a key coordinator of the 25 January protests,
Cairo, 2 Mar. 2011).17 The mobilization in the quarter was successful and
some fifteen hundred people—of some three thousand who marched out of
the quarter—made it to Tahrir Square (drawn from Ismail 2012). While
Bulaq al-Dakrur residents coordinated with youth organizers in Tahrir, in
nearby quarters such as Faysal processions were organized by local residents
themselves. Indeed, the experience of confrontation with the police and the
strength of hostility toward government among residents of quarters like
Bulaq al-Dakrur made them ideal spaces of mobilization during the Revolu-
tion’s early days. In their everyday encounters with the police, popular forces
honed a multitude of practices that ranged from evasion to confrontation (see
Ismail 2006). These practices of everyday life laid down a pattern of relations
and repertoires of action that were played out in the clashes with the police
during the Revolution.
Important here is the role that the members of the Ultras football team fan
groups played in the organization of marches to Tahrir. These youths, who
belong to neighborhood-based sections of the Ultras groups, led processions
from Haram, Faysal, and other popular neighborhoods. According to activists,
the Ultras, already experienced in countering police tactics of crowd control,
identified the weak points in security police lines and maneuvered to break
them (interview with Ahly Ultras activists, Cairo, May 2012). The marches
from popular quarters bear the marks of coordinated action not only because
core Tahrir Square protest leaders and activists mobilized on the ground in
Bulaq al-Dakrur, but also because Ultras youth from popular quarters discussed
the Facebook call for “a day of anger” and debated whether to participate as
Ultras or as individuals. They opted, first, to join quarter processions on an indi-
vidual basis and then, on 28 January, decided to participate under the Ultras
banners (ibid.).
Youth from popular quarters engaged in the protests informed by their
relations with the police, especially having been the primary targets of disci-
plinary practices such as ishtibah wa tahari. In the early 1980s, youth opposi-
tion was primarily expressed through activism in militant Islamist groups
(Ismail 2000). By the early 1990s, quietist religious groups and neighborhood
fraternities had supplanted the radical groups and became the basis for a
strongly territorialized youth identity invested in the quarter spaces such as
17 For a similar account, see Levinson and Coker 2011.
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alleyways, workshops, and informal markets. To the extent that this identity is
produced within relations of power, “the popular” as identity is inscribed in
“the subaltern” as positionality. Furthermore, this identity enters into the
making of political agency. For example, in my interviews with youths about
their relations with the police, they denounced their subjectivation by the
police. They also expressly noted contradictions and tensions between their
self-identities of “ibn al balad” (son of the country) or “sannayy‘i hur” (free
worker) and their subjection to police practices of humiliation (Ismail 2006;
interviews with youth activists, Cairo, Feb. 2011 and May 2012). Rami, an
Ahly Ultras activist who led a procession from Haram on 25 January, reflected
on the clashes with the police on the street and in the stadium: “It is a way of
saying [to the police] I have broken you. You sold the country; you are not
respectable. You humiliated me and belittled my dignity. You made me take
off my clothes when entering the stadium. This is how you treat us. I will
answer you from your own perspective and your culture. This expresses a con-
dition (hala)…. I was beaten; I experienced humiliation. For twenty-five years,
I was a non-participant” (interview, Cairo, May 2012).18
This account of the mobilization of popular forces and their participation
in the Revolution emphasizes that the infrastructures of protest lay in the micro-
processes of everyday life that developed at the quarter level, in community
forms of organization and in popular youth’s modes of action and interaction
with state government. The political agency of subaltern forces is not merely
reactive; it does not, as Bayat (2000) suggests, arise only when threatened by
government action. Such a reading of subaltern agency downplays the terms
in which everyday forms of organization and modes of governance and posi-
tioning vis-à-vis government furnish mobilizational resources, and generate
shared understandings and feelings that constitute the oppositional subject
who may act individually or in concert with others even when there is no
threat to their immediate interests. Youth fraternities (neighborhood-based
and street-centered everyday sociability circles organized around work and
home), charitable organizations, and neighborhood-based provision of security
not only allowed for a degree of disengagement from state government, but also
were frames of collective modes of everyday life. In other words, far from
living an atomized life or pursuing their means of living individually,
popular forces built community institutions, and fought over and negotiated
normative rules. Additionally, a political know-how, derived from the daily
experience of government, guided the participation of youth from popular
18 The Ultras and youth from popular quarters have continued to mobilize against the police and
the Ministry of the Interior, as witnessed in the battles of MohammadMahmoud Street andMansour
Street in central Cairo, notably in September and November of 2011, and in February 2012 in
response to the Port Said massacre in which Ahly Ultras fans were killed. It is alleged that rival
fans from the Port Said club murdered them, and it is suspected that they did so with police
complicity.
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quarters. Bashir’s distinction noted earlier, between elite politics and popular-
classes politics, resonates with Rami’s account, during the interview just quoted
from, of how Ultras activism and symbolic work fed into the Revolution:
“Everything we did is politics; the slogans and chants. We practice politics
using our language, the language of the people organized in the public
square. The slogans we shouted during the Revolution protests, we had
shouted before. In fights with the police we had chanted ‘ah ya dawlat
al-haramiyya, hiyya klabik al-dakhliyya’ (Oh state of thieves, the Interior Min-
istry are your dogs). After the 2010 elections we had chants like ‘ihna shababik
ya hurriyya’ (Oh freedom, we are your youth).”
The participation of popular forces in the Egyptian Revolution may appear
primarily contingent when understood only as part of a seemingly spontaneous
movement of mass mobilization and peaceful insurrection against the ruling
regime. Additionally, because they lack formal social movement organizations,
popular forces tend to be seen as followers, of either the organized Islamist
opposition or the middle-class activists who agitated for the national protests
that made up the first phase of the Revolution. However, this manner of
framing popular forces’ engagement and activism during and after the Tahrir
days does not capture factors that are crucial to explaining the massive partici-
pation of Cairo’s subaltern forces. From my sketch of quarter-based mobiliz-
ation and action we can glean three factors that have shaped the rising up of
subalterns against the regime: one, a degree of autonomy and disengagement
from the state that was achieved through informal economic and social arrange-
ments; two, the development of locally based internal forms of governance that
managed security needs and disputes, and enforced norms of interaction; and
three, oppositional positioning from state government and a long history of
conflictual interaction with state agents and agencies.
The popular forces, the youth, and the middle classes coalesced as “the
people” on 25 January 2011. Al sha‘b as the collective subject of the Revolu-
tion was formed in the coming together of social forces and individuals unified
by their rejection of a particular mode of government. These oppositional sub-
jects are not only collectivities organized in pursuit of specific goals; but are
also collections of individual subjects fashioned in interactions with agents
of the state. These subjectivities were formed among the popular forces and
in the spaces of the city’s popular quarters. These forces enacted their opposi-
tional subjectivities side by side with the visibly organized political opposition
in Tahrir (Ismail 2012).
D I F F E R E N T I AT E D U R B A N S U B A LT E R N I T Y I N S Y R I A
The Syrian Uprising has seen massive and sustained mobilization in a number
of Syrian cities, notably in Homs and Hama and in Damascus, where most of
the protest has taken place in the peripheral quarters and suburbs and in the
adjacent towns of the governorate of rural Damascus. At the same time, until
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recently, there was a noticeable quietism in other cities, particularly Aleppo.19
The latter’s reticence to join the Uprising and the relative quiet of central
Damascus have been interpreted as evidence of support for the regime in the
country’s two major cities. I want to address the particular geographical distri-
bution of the Uprising, focusing in particular on events in Damascus. Specifi-
cally, I will consider the question of how differentiated urban subalternity has
given rise to divisions among subaltern forces, with some segments supporting
the regime against the Uprising. In my examination of this question, I contend
that the particularities of the urban form and the socio-spatial divisions traver-
sing it are the main variables at work in creating and sustaining these divisions.
Damascus in the Syrian Uprising
The Uprising began in Dar‘a, a city in the southern governorate of Dar‘a on the
border with Jordan.20 The immediate spark was the detention and reported
torture of school children who wrote on their school wall the slogan of revolu-
tions elsewhere: “The people want to bring down the regime.” There were also
local grievances in Dar‘a having to do with land issues, construction permits,
and the like. In response to the violent suppression of the Dar‘a demonstrations,
protests were held in other cities and towns, which gave rise to further crack-
downs by the state, followed by a cycle of protests and violent suppression.
In my interviews with activists from various quarters of Damascus and other
parts of Syria, they confirmed that the mobilization in the early days of the
Uprising was not a response to calls on Facebook, beginning in late January
2011, for a Syrian “day of anger,” but rather a spontaneous action intended
to express solidarity for Dar‘a.21 Douma, a Damascus suburb, was one place
that rose in support of Dar‘a early on. Thus very soon after the events in
Dar‘a anti-government protest was taking place near the capital. In various
localities and regions, local concerns articulated with national aspirations and
objectives, and the initial, localized character of the protest movement increas-
ingly acquired a national-level orientation and structure through the establish-
ment of the Syrian Local Coordinating Committees (SLLC) and the Syrian
Revolution Coordination Union (SRCU).
19 The militarization of the Uprising in recent months has drawn Aleppo into it, and many parts
of the city have turned into virtual battlegrounds.
20 For an account of protest mobilization during the first six months of the Uprising, see Ismail
2011.
21 As the security forces responded with violence and protests grew and became focused on the
objective of overthrowing the regime, local coordinating committees were established. These com-
mittees used Facebook pages to communicate information about protests. Soon this locally based
activity was coordinated across neighborhoods and constituted a space for activism by youth of
diverse social and religious backgrounds. Secular and Salafi activists met in detention centers
where they exchanged contacts and expanded their networks and coordinated activities (personal
interviews with youth activists in Damascus between March and May of 2011; and personal
e-mailing with activists in Damascus, Homs, and Baniyas between October and December of 2011).
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What place does Damascus occupy in the Uprising? Despite the apparent
calm, the city has seen widespread activism in three types of urban spaces: tra-
ditional quarters such as Midan and Rukn al-Din; informal quarters/suburbs
such as Barzeh, Qaboun, Harasta, and Douma (the latter falls administratively
within the Rural Damascus governorate); and towns in the governorate of rural
Damascus such as Darayya and Mu‘adhamiyya.22 How do we explain this con-
figuration? Why has protest not spread to all of Damascus, and what role do
socio-spatial variables play in this patterning of protest?
Elements of Urban Division: Subalternity in Informal Quarters
State practices of cooptation, incorporation, and exclusion are operative in the
reproduction of societal forces and their constitution of political agency. The
re-composition and realignment of social forces brought about by the ruling
Ba‘th Party’s populist policies at various phases of its rule must be considered.
Though developmentalist phases targeted rural areas, the investment was
uneven and not necessarily productive. Governorates that did not fit into the
grand design of capitalized agricultural production—the governorate of Lata-
kiyya, for example—saw the inhabitants of entire villages migrate to cities, pri-
marily Damascus. For many households, volunteering for the army was the
only avenue of employment. This was the case for Alawis and members of
poorer populations of the Syrian Peninsula (the northeastern region of the
country). This pattern of recruitment into the army provided nodal connections
between the regime and disadvantaged sectors of the population, while, also,
inscribing societal lines of division between agents of state violence and
control (e.g., the army) and other social groups with whom they in fact share
common socio-economic positions. Loyalty to the regime and to the president
must be understood in terms of these patterns of populist cooptation and their
spatial grounding.
If we turn to consider the patterns of rural-urban settlement—with rural
populations being the Ba‘th Party’s historical base and the regime’s nodal con-
nection and point of relay—we get a clearer picture of how traditional societal
divisions were recast in identitarian terms, fracturing the social body into “us”
and “them” camps. To understand the reconfiguration of urban space and the
realignment of social forces that capture the dynamics of conflict and division
that, in turn, shape the formation of subjectivities and the positioning of sub-
jects vis-à-vis the state, it is important to look at how the developmentalist
and populist politics have marked the urban form, in particular, in Damascus,
the seat of governmental power (see Hinnebusch 1990).
22 With the increased militarization of the Uprising, these quarters and suburbs became sites of
refuge and activities of armed groups under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. As a result, over
the last few months, they have been targets of heavy shelling and military incursions by Syrian
forces loyal to the regime.
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Damascus is divided along social, economic, cultural, and religious lines.
Historically a mercantile city, its population was predominately Sunni but with
a sizeable Christian minority. Until the late-colonial period, much of the city’s
political life centered round its old quarters, which were organized along socio-
religious lines (see Khoury 1984). The expansion of the city brought greater
social and demographic differentiation with the emergence of informal quarters
and the movement of many old-quarter residents to rural Damascus. This
expansion was, in part, a response to large-scale rural migration into the city
from other governorates such as Idlib (predominately Sunni) and the coastal
areas (primarily Alawi), which began in the 1960s and intensified in the
1970s and 1980s.
These new quarters represent a form of urban settlement based on regional
origin and sect membership, as well as their links to the military and the state. A
segment of the migration was tied to the military and its rise to power. Army
soldiers, volunteers, and conscripts were settled in the city’s periphery. This
pattern of settlement was tied to inhabitants’ relations with the regime. Thus,
the quarter of Mezza 86, built into the rocky terrain of Mezza Mountain,
emerged in the mid-1970s for the purpose of settling the members of Rif‘at
al-Asad’s “86 Division.” Its inhabitants were low-level army volunteers (saf
dabit), below officer rank. Mezza 86 residents are 85 percent Alawi. The
history of the quarter’s establishment exemplifies a pattern of incorporation
into the regime through the organs of coercion. Nonetheless, the residents’
urban integration or lack thereof reveals how societal divisions are maintained
and manipulated. The terms of insertion of migrants into the city—economi-
cally, socially, and culturally—betray exclusion and marginalization. In my
work on the urban economy of Damascus, I found that “traditional” economic
activities of commerce and artisanal production remain primarily in the hands
of Sunni merchants and have not integrated the newcomers except as menial
workers. In Mezza 86, the first generation of migrants found work in the
army but the new generation has been engaged mostly in marginal economic
activity.
Like Mezza 86, Qaboun is an informal quarter built on agricultural land. It
attracted migrants from northern Syria (especially rural Idlib) and rural Damas-
cus, many of them military conscripts, and its residents found work on the
margins of the local economy. Some took up smuggling in the late 1970s
and early 1980s when conscripts who served in Lebanon smuggled in goods
such as clothes, electrical goods, and automobile parts. Other residents
branched into the service industries as minivan owners and operators. Like resi-
dents of Mezza 86, those of Qaboun have not been integrated into the Damas-
cene economy, but they differ in that they do not depend on the regime for
employment and thus have maintained a degree of autonomy from it.
The main distinction between the two quarters has to do with social and
political proximity to the regime. Mezza 86 was coopted by it at the time of
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settlement and was constructed as an appendage to the ruling group. The
dynamics of relations between Mezza 86 and the regime help explain the
sense of precariousness that the residents felt at the time of Hafez al-Asad’s
death in 2000. It is said that some prepared to leave the city and return to
their villages of origin as they grew increasingly uncertain about their future
and fearful they would face retribution for having been loyalists. During the
current Uprising, Mezza 86 has maintained the loyalist line, while Qaboun
has risen up against the regime.
In the narrative history of Mezza 86—from the allocation of space or
permission to squat to the provision of infrastructure services—the quarter
is portrayed as an appendage of the rulers. Older residents of the quarter
whom I interviewed in 2005 often ended their reflections with the words:
“Life is good, we thank the president,” or “May God protect the president.”
There is more to such statements than being versed in the cult of the
leader, for they are also acknowledgement of clientelist relations that call
for gratitude, which is expressed in terms euphemizing relations of
subordination.
Relations with the regime and the demographic composition of quarters
are the main variables at play in the differentiated responses to the Uprising
observed in Damascus and elsewhere. In this complex urban configuration
are found conflicts over title to land and position in relation to government,
conflicts inflected with sectarian meanings. These divisions are well illustrated
by the case of the Barzeh quarter on the northern edge of Damascus and its
relationship with the neighboring community of ‘Ish al-Warwar. The Barzeh
quarter is built on agricultural land, and maintains a nucleus of its original
inhabitants in the area known as Barzeh al-Balad. These long-time inhabitants
are referred to as Barzawi to denote their territorialized identity. Barzeh’s
expansion and urban build-up began in the 1970s with the state expropriation
of land for the middle-class residential project of Masakin Barzeh (Barzeh
housing). Land was expropriated for the purpose of erecting military facilities,
including a military hospital. The breakup of Barzeh land and the inscription of
antagonisms towards the regime deepened when the families of a military unit
of Rif’at al-Asad’s brigades were settled on land in a rocky area called ‘Ish
al-Warwar adjacent to Barzeh al-Balad. The area was considered part of the
communal territory of the original Barzeh inhabitants, and the settlement
caused tensions from the start. It sparked an early incident of violence that is
now referred to as ahdath Barzeh (the events of Barzeh). In 1975, according
to my informants, the new neighbors from the ‘Ish attacked a coffee shop
where community elders had gathered to allot access to wells for irrigating
fields. A fight broke out and some Barzeh al-Balad elders were killed. As
the ‘Ish was considered to be under Rif’at al-Asad’s protection, the Barzeh resi-
dents believed there was little they could do to get redress, and some, fearing
retribution for their role in the fight, fled.
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In the current Uprising, Barzawis and ‘Ish al-Warwar inhabitants have
come into conflict again. Based on accounts from a number of informants,
the conflict is caused by ‘Ish al-Warwar residents attacking and trying to sup-
press demonstrations. In the early days of the Uprising the ‘Ish al-Warwar resi-
dents were told that the Barzawis were planning to attack them to regain their
land. Warnings of this type are believed to be part of a regime strategy in
various parts of the country to sow seeds of sectarian conflict, and I will
return to this presently. ‘Ish al-Warwar residents were thus mobilized against
their neighbors. Two of my Barzeh interviewees portrayed low-level army
recruits of the ‘Ish as having more in common with their downtrodden
Barzeh neighbors than with the regime they were defending. In this face-off,
two subaltern groups lined up against each other. In the words of one Barzeh
activist: “the ‘Ish people are oppressed like us, and they are treated as slaves,
but they defend the regime because they are made to fear their ‘extremist’
Sunni neighbors” (interview, May 2011).
Mezza 86 and ‘Ish al-Warwar may represent the extreme form of clienta-
lization through employment, bureaucratic favors, and residential arrange-
ments, but they also exemplify the spatial and demographic patterns of
change associated with the militarization of rule and of society. Entire quarters
were established on the periphery of the city to house army personnel and their
families, while in other quarters, particular sections or areas are identified with
the military. In Qaboun, the residential buildings next to the military barracks
were reserved for families of military personnel, most if not all of whom were
Alawi. When I conducted interviews in the area in 2005, these buildings were
often pointed out to me as places reserved for Alawis only.
The Barzeh and ‘Ish al-Warwar alignment juxtaposes two poor quarters,
one built in the service of the regime on expropriated land claimed by the
other. This inscribes division and conflict on the basis of clientelization and
exclusion, which, by virtue of the differing religious affiliations of each
quarter, acquire a confessional inflection. Similar patterns of residential
arrangements can be found in other quarters and neighborhoods around Damas-
cus. The establishment of residential quarters of army families and security ser-
vices provides the regime with buffer zones within urban spaces and divides the
population. The urban and spatial arrangements and their demographic charac-
teristics are one dimension of the social differentiation expressed in identitarian
terms. The elements of urban divisions I have sketched here offer a glimpse of
the dynamics of how the population has been ensnared, through cooptation and
marginalization, in the web of authority and power.
What are the identitarian dimensions of the quarters’ different political
positioning in the Uprising? Mezza 86 and Barzeh embody the “us” and
“them” division along socio-economic lines that overlap with affiliation or
membership in particular confessional groups. Both quarters are on the city’s
margins in economic, social, and cultural terms. The main distinction
884 S A LWA I S M A I L
between the Sunni rural migrants and the Alawi rural migrants has to do with
the functionalization of sect as a mechanism in the institution of coercion, and
its articulation with the socio-spatial and economic realignments of the populist
phase and, later on, with the neoliberal conjuncture. The sectarian divisions
revolve around Alawi links with the regime and, on the whole, do not
express antagonisms stemming from doctrinal beliefs. Alawis, as a community,
are seen to supply the regime with muscle and to reap benefits in return, and the
anger directed at Alawis is primarily due to their perceived position as suppor-
ters and beneficiaries of the regime.23 As observed by Mallon (1994: 1511),
when we scrutinize local relations of power, the presumed solidarity and
unity of the subaltern dissolves and we are confronted instead with thorny
issues of complicity and hierarchy among subaltern communities.
Subalternity in Syria has been differentiated in terms of relations with the
regime. Clientelized since their establishment, and embodying the regime’s
strategies of cultivating and exploiting sectarian divisions, poor quarters such
as Mezza 86 have supplied some of the coercive force used against the Upris-
ing. According to local observers, many of the young men from these quarters
have now joined the shabiha—the hired strongmen that attack demonstrations
on behalf of the regime. It is also among these clientelized sectors that the
regime draws supporters for pro-Asad rallies.
Old Damascus and Rural Damascus in the Uprising
If some of the strongest opposition to the regime has come out of informal quar-
ters such as Barzeh and Qaboun, a number of the historical quarters of Damas-
cus have also been at the forefront of oppositional mobilization and activism.
Most notable are Midan and Rukn al-Din, both representative of traditional
Sunni Damascene society. Rukn al-Din is also the city’s historical Kurdish
quarter. Here I will focus on Midan’s participation in the Uprising.
As one of the city’s historical quarters, Midan has preserved its
traditional identity and demographic composition through a period of rapid
transformation. Unlike intra-muros quarters such as Shaghour Juwwani and
al-Qaymiriyya, which lost many old families to either modern quarters or
rural Damascus, Midan retained many of its established and prominent
families. It is closely identified with Damascene merchant and manufacturing
households that work and trade in the markets of Hamidiyya and Hariqa. By
virtue of this association, Midan has preserved a certain degree of continuity
23 This should not be understood to mean that the Alawis, as a community, rule Syria or that the
regime has ruled on their behalf. Until the beginning of the Uprising, the regime was based on a
historical alliance—consolidated with the crushing of the Islamist insurgency in 1982—between
the Alawi-dominated military elite and the upper-class Sunni merchants. This alliance allowed
the latter to safeguard their economic interests and prosper. Even before the Uprising, this alliance
was under strain due to the growth of monopoly capitalism associated with the regime’s inner circle
(see Ismail 2009).
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in the city’s urban history. Quarter residents articulate a strong, territorialized
identity associated with a conservative lifestyle and long, continuous residence
in the quarter. For example, young people from Midan whom I interviewed
often invoked a Midani identity to explain cultural practices governing
gender interactions.
Historically, the relationship between Midan and the regime has been
characterized by autonomy and antagonism. The mercantile and manufacturing
economic activities of Midanis have afforded them relative autonomy from the
regime.24 There is an undercurrent of hostility toward the regime as well, linked
to the quarter having been implicated in anti-regime activities connected with
the Islamist insurgency in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was in relation
to these activities that the regime first attempted to penetrate Midan. At that
time, youth from Midan organized in religious circles centered on a number
of mosques and joined the Islamist opposition. Also during that period, the
regime implemented plans to transform the quarter’s spatial arrangements,
most importantly by building a wide road that cut through its middle, splitting
what had been contiguous space into sections. This was associated with the
construction of modern high-rises on the far extension of the new road,
which transformed the built environment characterized, until then, by narrow
alleyways and traditional “Arab homes.” However, some of the old sections
have survived, and these are where most of the demonstrations have taken
place. The alleyways and networks of neighborhood association have been hos-
pitable space for protests. Midan activists also organize flash protests in which
slogans are shouted decrying the regime and declaring that in Midan it has
fallen (andna bil midan saqt al-nizam). These protests are intended to assert
a wider opposition presence in the quarter and to garner and demonstrate
quarter support for the Uprising.
Activists I interviewed after the Uprising had started pointed out that grie-
vances against the regime extend back to the period of the Islamist opposition,
and that many families have had members imprisoned or disappeared. In
addition to this history, Midan’s central mosques proved fertile ground for
the mobilization of youth with their own grievances. Although some activists
came from outside Midan, on the whole the protests took root in the quarter
and centered on key mosques and their surrounding areas (e.g., al-Hasan,
Manjak, al-Daqqaq, and Mansour). To explain the nearly unique ability of
Midani residents to mount a sustained campaign of protest we must take
into account historical, demographic and spatial factors. The presence of
24 I have noted elsewhere that Damascene middle-merchants have shied away from entering into
partnerships with newcomers to the city, including regime figures. On the whole, the two main city
markets have been closed to outsiders (Ismail 2009). In this respect, we can also speak of societal
practices of exclusion in which rural-urban divisions as well as religious and cultural practices are
played out to maintain social distinction and differentiation.
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long-established families has bolstered the community’s ability to guard against
internal divisions and maintain a unified position. The Local Coordinating
Committee (LCC) of the quarter devised various strategies to contain the
regime’s informants (known as ‘awayniyya), naming them and using familial
ties and employment associations to dissuade them from continuing their
cooperation with the regime.
In trying to explain the relative quietism of other city quarters, both new
and old, activists argued that the influx of new residents and departure of many
traditional Damascenes played a part in limiting mobilization. They also noted
that the close-knit social networks of adjacent towns have been a factor in their
strong participation in the Uprising. Some pointed out that Damascenes travel
to satellite towns such as Mu‘adhamiyya to protest. Beyond these factors, we
must also recognize the impact of the extensive presence of security forces
in the city’s central areas. One document prepared by activists to assess the
feasibility of occupying city squares observed that Damascus’ main square,
Umayyad Square, was fortified from all directions, and that in the immediate
vicinity were ten thousand of the Republican Guard (stationed nearby), the
Air Force headquarters, the army chief of staff offices, the criminal security
headquarters, the political police, and the state security. Central Damascus
was viewed as a military garrison that the unarmed protestors could not take on.
As I have already noted, the new towns adjacent to Damascus have been
sites of increased resistance to the regime, and I want to highlight briefly their
place in the Uprising. A number of these towns—some right on the city’s edge
and others within a half-hour’s drive—have witnessed wide-scale mobilization
and intensified protests. For instance, residents of Joubar and Saqba, contigu-
ous towns located in the al-Ghuta al-Sharqiyya, tried to march into the city and
occupy Al-Abassiyyin Square in its northeast. One early attempt, in April 2011,
saw an estimated thirty thousand protesters mobilized from the two towns.
They marched to Abassiyyin Square only to meet security forces who dispersed
them with gunfire and live bullets. Abassiyyin Square was attractive to the
marchers because there is only one security branch in its vicinity (Air Force
intelligence). Also, it is within a 4–10 kilometer radius of the mobilized quar-
ters and districts (al-Tel, Douma, Harasta, Joubar, ‘Arbin, Qaboun, Barzeh,
Midan, and Rukn al-Din) (from a strategy document posted on the website
of the Midan Coordinating Committee of the Revolution, on 1 Aug. 2011).
Relatively distant and newly urbanized agglomerations such as Darayya
and Mu‘adhamiyya, both located in al-Ghuta al-Gharbiyya, have been at the
forefront of weekly and daily protests. It is noteworthy that a substantial pro-
portion of their populations is made up of people originally from Damascus
who consider themselves Damascene—the inhabitants refer to themselves as
“shuwam” (a term used to evoke indigenous Damascene identity), and alley-
ways in the newly established neighborhoods have been named “harat
al-shuwam.” It is worth noting, also, that Damascus has always maintained
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close relationships with these towns since many of the Damascene merchants
own agricultural land there and set up workshops linked to their commerce
in these rural towns. Moreover, the Damascenes who moved there were
seeking more affordable land on which to build homes to accommodate their
extended families, thus reproducing features of family living in Old Damascus.
The Damascenes preserved their mercantile and artisanal vocations, which inte-
grated well into the existing economic activities of the towns. The Damascus
rural hinterland developed areas of economic specialization such as carpentry,
and the production of canned and dried foods, and textiles. Many of these enter-
prises are small workshops with just two to three workers who produce for
large merchants in the city. In some cases, these economic activities suffered
from economic liberalization policies, which provoked hostility toward the
regime among a stratum that has preserved a level of autonomy all along.
The close ties that these Damascenes maintained with the Old City were on
display during the Uprising—activists from Darayya often traveled to Damas-
cus to mobilize protest in al-Midan and other central city mosques (interview
with Darayya activist originally from Old Damascus, May 2011), and Damas-
cenes went to Darayya and Mu‘adhamiyya to protest, as well.
The demographic and spatial reconfiguration of Damascus over the last
forty years must be considered in analyzing the patterns of mobilization seen
there. This reconfiguration is characterized by the emergence of new, informal
quarters on the city’s periphery; the inscription of sectarian lines of division in
the topography; the movement of residents from Old Damascus to the suburbs
and to newly urbanized towns in the city’s historical rural hinterland; and the
influx of migrants into the city and their settlement along lines that reproduce
an identitarian politics, in which affiliation with a particular sect is politicized.
The Socio-Spatiality of the Syrian Uprising
The geography of the Syrian Uprising has raised many questions relating to the
social forces that support and oppose the regime. Among these is the question
of whether the lines of division are primarily religious/sectarian. I will stress
some of the key propositions found in accounts given by Syria analysts and
observers and will also raise some questions that future research can help to
answer.
Some analysts have advanced the view that the Uprising is primarily
Sunni, pointing to its location in predominately Sunni areas and to the relative
quiet in cities and governorates with large religious minorities, for example in
the governorate of Suwayda with its substantial Druze population (e.g., Rasas
2011; Balanche 2011). This same assessment is also made regarding Christian
Syrians, who are less concentrated in any particular governorate but are more
likely to be identified with specific city quarters in Damascus, Aleppo,
Homs, and Hama, which have seen little if any popular protest. In this connec-
tion, one Syrian analyst proposed that religious minorities have taken a stance
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as minorities, while Sunni participation in the Uprising has been modulated
along class lines, with upper-class Sunnis either supporting the regime or stand-
ing on the sidelines and lower-class Sunnis being heavily involved (Rasas
2011). Although this account may be deduced from the geography of the Upris-
ing, it over-simplifies by giving religion too much weight as an explanatory
variable. We need to integrate into our analysis other factors characteristic of
the geography of protest.
We have seen that, for Damascus, several factors inform the positioning of
various forces in the Uprising: a particular history of quarter establishment and
settlement, the quarter residents’ relations to government, and regime policies
of incorporation and exclusion. At issue is not any presumed primordial attach-
ment to a particular religious community, but instead the regime’s political
functionalization of sect through the cooptation and clientelization of segments
of the Alawi community. One can argue that the regime pursued a policy of
“communal corporatism,” wherein individuals were incorporated on the basis
of group membership and loyalty. For example, the Hafez al-Asad regime
helped maintain the tribal structure and hierarchy, and relied on tribal leaders
to deliver loyalty and support (see Chatty 2010).25 Beyond its use of cooptation
and clientelization, the regime also manipulated fears of sectarian division and
conflict. These fears were nurtured in part by banishing from the public sphere
any discussion of matters of religious identity and affiliation, in the name of the
dominant secular ideology. The result was that the sectarian dimension of gov-
ernment institutions was pushed out of public discussion yet remained a focus
of hidden tensions and resentments.
In the central quarters of the city of Homs, we find strains similar to those
observed in the peripheral quarters of Damascus. That is, quarters with predo-
minately Sunni populations joined the Uprising early on while neighboring
quarters with predominantly Alawi populations remained loyal to the regime.
From the different accounts of activists and observers, the regime appears to
have pursued a policy of sectarian mobilization, with the security forces creat-
ing pretexts for conflict between the communities. For example, it is reported
that the security forces adopted a deliberate policy of recruiting men from the
Alawi quarters to form armed militias (known as shabiha) to attack the quarters
participating in the Uprising. The regime’s historical policy of recruiting
“muscle” from among the Alawis has also added to the sectarian antagonisms
in these areas, whereas, before, the two communities had lived side by side for
generations. In a context of polarization similar to that in the peripheral quarters
of Damascus, the central quarters of Homs aligned on opposite sides, with the
pro-regime quarters serving as buffer zones against neighboring quarters.
25 The regime armed Sunni tribal elements in the north to combat the Islamist opposition in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. During the Uprising, allied Sunni clans in Aleppo formed armed militia
to crush the protests.
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In his analysis of the geography of the Uprising, Fabrice Balanche (2011)
argues that there are two distinct patterns of communally based urban organiz-
ation. The first is that of “encircled cities,” of which Damascus and Hama are
examples (i.e., cities where Alawi quarters are on the periphery). The second is
the “divided” pattern, exemplified by Homs (Alawi quarters are located in the
city’s center). This geographic snapshot captures the surface territorial div-
isions. Balanche emphasizes the spatial proximity of many of the rebellious
quarters to “Alawi territories” to posit that the Uprising is Sunni in character
and expresses communal struggles.26 However, the dynamics at work in all
of these spaces have to do with socio-political processes discussed earlier,
wherein the regime uses the configuration of urban space to fracture the
social body. The inscription of antagonisms in urban space is closely tied to
the dynamics of power relations involving subaltern forces and the ruling
regimes or cliques. In Damascus, the alignment of Alawi quarters with the
regime is founded on their position in the apparatuses of coercion, and their
insertion into the urban setting as an extension of the ruling clique. In turn,
the mobilization against the regime in quarters like Qaboun and Barzeh is
driven by the people’s experience of social, economic, and political exclusion.
Positionality vis-à-vis the regime, which as a result of specific socio-historical
and political processes has intersected with sectarian affiliation, informs polar-
ization and divisions among subaltern forces.
C O N C L U S I O N
In the urban revolutionary protests in both Egypt and Syria, popular forces rose
up against oppressive forms of government experienced in the everyday. In
both settings, social strata that had been denied basic civil and social rights
mobilized in large numbers with the objective of bringing about a radical
change of government. The collective protest actions in both countries share
common urban features, namely the participation of people from excluded
and peripheral urban spaces. However, when we compare the two cases
closely, important differences emerge.
In Cairo, in addition to the occupation of large squares by vast segments of
the urban population, an urban battle took place behind the scenes and in the
back streets. In the city’s new popular quarters and the quarters of the Old
City, segments of the population directed their opposition and attacks at
police stations. The anger at government was rooted in the quotidian experience
26 Balanche (2011: 450) argues that religious minorities sustain the regime, while the main threat
to its survival resides in a “united Sunni Arab community.” This construction of the opposition to
the regime as driven by Sunni communal solidarity overplays the sectarian factor in accounting for
the Uprising. In fact, the Uprising in its civil and peaceful component has articulated a clear anti-
sectarian platform through the statements of the coordinating bodies and the writings of political
dissidents. Furthermore, certain segments of the Alawi community, in particular writers and intel-
lectuals, have lent their support to the Uprising.
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of interaction with the police at the local level, in urban neighborhoods. The
battles in popular quarters were inscribed spatially and recalled a particular
history of hostility and opposition to government. Integral to the making of
the collective subject—the people/al-sha‘b—and to its assumption of political
agency, are the territorialized subjectivities that were enacted in the street
warfare.
Patterns of popular participation and opposition to the regime witnessed in
Damascus and other cities in Syria have differed significantly from those
observed in Cairo. My discussion has emphasized socio-spatial factors that
have contributed to the fragmentation of subaltern forces in Syria, most impor-
tantly the history of the establishment of new urban quarters associated with the
militarization of government. A number of quarters in peripheral areas of
Damascus were built to house low-level military recruits and their families,
and due to the practices and strategies of recruitment into the military since
the 1970s, their populations were predominately if not entirely Alawi. The
identification of these quarters with the regime, and particularly with the coer-
cive apparatus, entrenched divisions based on an intersection of religious
affiliation and socio-political positionality within the peripheral, marginalized,
and excluded urban sectors. The regime has instrumentalized the socio-spatial
configurations of the quarters whenever it has been challenged, and this has, in
effect, turned segments of subaltern migrant populations into buffers for the
regime. These features of urban space in Damascus underscore how important
the history and character of urban reconfiguration are in determining the shape
and course of popular protest and mobilization during revolutionary periods. In
Damascus, social differentiation and divisions among the subaltern forces are
built into the spatial and demographic reconfiguration of Damascus over the
last forty years.
Both cases highlight aspects of the mutual inscription of the subaltern and
the popular. In Cairo, the popular is produced in relations of subordination and
exclusion as well as through practices of self-valorization and authentication.
Practices of subordination entail the deployment by dominant forces of stigma-
tizing discourses against popular neighborhoods to justify acts of police vio-
lence and dispossession there. In turn, “the people” (al-sha‘b), as a
collectivity with claims to rights, is mobilized. The contested nature of the
“popular” is a constitutive element of subalternity as a positionality in a field
of political and social struggle. In this respect, the popular as identity enters
into the making of subaltern political agency. As Richard Pithouse cautions,
we should not read this political agency as an “automatic expression of
culture” (2012). The practices and repertoires of resistance may be invested
with cultural symbolism, but they develop within power matrices, and not as
the expression of fixed cultural habituations.
The subaltern, as position, does not predetermine the kind of politics sub-
alterns engage in, as demonstrated in the case of Damascus. Differentiated
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subalternity, informed by the Syrian regime’s policies of cooptation and exclu-
sion, is manifested in divisions and conflicts among subaltern forces that are
articulated in identitarian terms. While we uphold the argument against an
essential topography of subaltern urbanism, we must take note of the terms
in which subordination and resistance are spatially marked.
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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of urban subalterns both as participa-
tory agents in the Arab revolutions and as mediating forces against revolutionary
action. It argues that during revolutionary periods the positioning of subalterns as
a political force should be understood in relation to their socio-spatial location in
the urban political configuration. Looking at the protest movements in Cairo and
Damascus, the paper examines the differentiated locations of subaltern actors in
each to demonstrate how their positioning in relation to state and government has
shaped their engagement in the revolutions. In Cairo, the mobilization of subal-
tern forces was anchored in spatialized forms of everyday interaction between
popular forces and agents of government. These interactions were formative of
urban subjectivities that entered into the making of “the people” as the subject
of the Revolution. In Damascus, the configuration of the urban space and the
Syrian regime’s modes of control made it difficult for subaltern forces to mobilize
on the same scale as in Cairo or to form a unified opposition. The regime instru-
mentalized socio-spatial fragmentation among subalterns, in effect turning some
segments, as buffers for the regime, against others. In analytical terms, the paper
underscores the common conceptual ground between the categories of “urban
popular forces” and “urban subalterns.” This ground covers their socio-spatial
positionality, their bases of action, and the factors shaping their political
subjectivities.
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